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Traditional demand models assume that consumers are perfectly informed about product
characteristics, including price. However, this assumption may be too strong. Unannounced
sales are a common supermarket practice. As we show, retailers frequently change position
in the price rankings, thus making it unlikely that consumers are aware of all deals o¤ered in
each period. Further empirical evidence on consumer behavior is also consistent with a model
with price information frictions. We develop such a model for horizontally di¤erentiated
products and structurally estimate the search cost distribution. The results show that in
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biased price elasticities.
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1 Introduction
Traditional demand models assume that consumers are perfectly informed about all product
characteristics. However, unannounced, short-term reductions in the prices of certain products
(sales) represent a common and frequent supermarket pricing strategy. If consumers cannot
perfectly predict the timing of sales at every store, they cannot know what deals are o¤ered
by the various stores in each period. Thus, the consumers must incur a cost to determine the
prices before making a purchase decision.
Ignoring imperfect price information can lead not only to biased demand parameter esti-
mates but also to wrong implications for competition policy and incorrect inferences concerning
retailersassortment decisions.1 To verify whether price information frictions are indeed preva-
lent, we rst investigate their importance in consumersfood product choices. We analyze not
only price distribution movements but also how transaction prices relate to household charac-
teristics such as the opportunity cost of time, storage costs and number of store visits. We nd
compelling evidence that price information is not freely and readily available without search.
We therefore develop and estimate a demand model with imperfect information on prices in
which consumers have heterogeneous tastes and products di¤er in quality. Consumers sequen-
tially search for their favorite product, and the probability of nding a certain product is both
product- and consumer-specic.
Our model is based on Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004), who study the mutual fund indus-
try. Our main contribution has two important dimensions. First, we allow for heterogeneous
consumer tastes. Horizontal di¤erentiation is especially important for brick-and-mortar stores
because of, for example, geographical location. Ignoring such di¤erentiation could signicantly
bias demand estimation results. Second, our contribution is also methodological. We sug-
gest a new simple and exible identication strategy that makes it possible to recover model
parameters when both consumer tastes and drawing probabilities are heterogeneous. In Hor-
taçsu and Syverson, when products are vertically di¤erentiated, identication is possible only if
the sampling probabilities are equal across sellers. When these probabilities di¤er across sellers,
identication requires the assumption that products are homogenous. The issue is that although
consumers can rank indirect utilities, the econometrician cannot. In the case of homogeneous
products, the ranking of indirect utilities simply follows the ranking of observable prices. In
1See, for example, Stahl (1989) on the welfare e¤ects of entry, Allen, Clark and Houde (2013) on merger e¤ects,
Rhodes (2015) on supermarkets market power, and Cachon, Terwiesch and Xu (2008) on rms assortment
decisions.
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the case of vertical di¤erentiation and identical drawing probabilities across stores, the ranking
of utilities follows the ranking of the observable aggregate quantities. Identication is straight-
forward in these two cases. However, we show that it is also possible to recover the ranking
of indirect utilities in the case of both vertically and horizontally di¤erentiated products. This
enables identication of the search cost distribution and other model parameters for more gen-
eral consumer heterogeneity in tastes and drawing probabilities. Our approach is very exible
with respect to probability draws that can be specic to consumer types, as well as to stores
and time. We identify these probabilities from observed shopping behavior, as we observe every
food purchase and store visit made by households. Hence, we can recover, for each consumer
and period, the empirical distribution of store visits and use it in our identication strategy.
There is a growing literature on the estimation of consumer choice with search costs. Hong
and Shum (2006), using only price data, identify search costs for books sold online. Also requir-
ing only price data, Moraga-González and Wildenbeest (2006) identify search costs for personal
computer memory chips, using data obtained from a web-based search engine. Honka (2014)
develops a discrete choice model of demand with non-sequential consumer search applied to
auto insurance contracts. Koulayev (2014) studies web searches for hotels. Moraga-González,
Sandor and Wildenbeest (2011) study consumer choice of cars with search costs, where con-
sumersconsumption sets are endogenous. Allen, Clark and Houde (2014) develop a model of
search in markets with price negotiation and apply it to mortgages in Canada.
Similar to our application, Wildenbeest (2011) studies search for grocery items in brick-and-
mortar UK supermarkets. Although he allows for quality di¤erentiation, there is no consumer
taste heterogeneity. This is an important restriction in the context of traditional stores because
location is an important horizontal attribute of stores that a¤ects consumer preferences.
Another paper that studies search in supermarkets is that of Seiler (2013). However, his
setting di¤ers form ours: consumers visit a certain store for exogenous reasons and, once at the
store, decide whether to search for the price of a product. Search is therefore a binary decision
of whether to walk down the product aisle and is made across products within a store, not
across stores. Pires (2015) also studies search within a grocery store but over a specic product
category (laundry detergent). Once at the store, consumers decide whether to search and the
set of products to search.
Our empirical investigation is performed on a comprehensive consumer-level dataset that
includes every food product purchased by a representative survey of French households over 3
years, 1999, 2000, and 2001. We have information on product and store characteristics, as well
as household demographics. We focus on 4 product categories: beer, co¤ee, cola, and whisky.
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Consistent with a large body of literature2, we show that price dispersion is prevalent in the
French food market, even after controlling for observed and unobserved product characteristics.
We also check for intertemporal price dispersion. If price information is not perfect, then
price dispersion should persist over time. Otherwise, consumers would learn the identity of
the cheapest store, and all other stores would have zero demand. We observe stores frequently
changing rank position in the pricing distribution. Finally, inspired by Aguiar and Hurst (2007),
we study the correlation between prices paid and a households opportunity cost of time. If
consumers are imperfectly informed about prices, then families with a high opportunity cost of
time and thus higher search costs should pay higher prices. Controlling for unobservable
household and store characteristics, we nd that this is indeed the case. We also nd that
households with higher opportunity costs of time have a lower probability of paying the lowest
price and that they visit fewer stores per period, while prices decrease with the number of per
period store visits.
The results from the demand model show that most consumers (approximately 85%) obtain
at most three utility quotes before purchasing a product. A large proportion of consumers
(between 50% and 60%) observe only the price of the product that they actually purchase.
These ndings suggest important information frictions. If price information is freely available
(in other words, consumers are perfectly informed), we should nd that consumers observe
all prices before making a purchase. The results also imply that rms have relatively high
local market power. We show how to obtain the own- and cross-price elasticities implied by
the demand model with imperfect information, and we estimate these price elasticities and
compare them to those one would estimate using a perfect information demand model. The
perfect information measures are severely biased (often by more than 100% ) in directions that
vary across products. This is similar to Koulayev (2014)s results. Our price elasticity results
are also consistent with previous studies reporting di¤erent directions of the bias depending
on the application and market studied. For example, Honka (2014) nd perfect information
price elasticities that overestimate price elasticities in the imperfect information model. In
contrast, De Los Santos, Hortaçsu and Wildenbeest (2012) and Sovinsky (2008), who studies
the US personal computers market, nds that the full information model underestimates demand
elasticities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2, describes the data and the products used in the
2See, for instance, Sorensen (2000), Lach (2002), Lewis (2008), Giulietti, Otero and Waterson (2009), and
Allen, Clark and Houde (2014). For a review of empirical studies of price dispersion online, see Baye, Morgan,
and Scholten (2006).
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analysis, while Section 3 presents the reduced-form tests. In Section 4, we describe the model of
consumer choice behavior with sequential search and the empirical identication strategy. The
results of the estimation of the search cost distribution and price elasticities are presented in
Section 5. Finally, the last section concludes.
2 Data and Product Choice
The data set is a representative survey of households distributed across all regions of France. It
provides information on three years: 1999, 2000, and 2001. Households register every food prod-
uct purchased using a scanner. For each product purchased, we have information on its brand
and characteristics, including price, pack size, container, label, date of purchase, and the store
where it was purchased. We also have comprehensive information on household demographics.
We study 4 product categories: beer, cola, co¤ee, and whisky. All products are frequently
purchased, with the exception of whisky. We choose to include whisky to check whether price
dispersion and search activity vary in the case of relatively expensive products. Furthermore,
we choose to study branded products, which are the most commonly studied in applications
of demand for di¤erentiated products and competition policy. Finally, these products could
trigger store visits and single product search.
Household characteristics used in the analysis include the number of store visits per house-
hold per week, the age of the household head, a dummy variable indicating the presence of a
baby (a child of less than 4 years of age) in the household, the education level of the household
head, the household size, and dummy variables indicating whether the household is rich (in
the upper half of the income distribution), whether it lives in a rural area, and whether the
household head is professionally inactive. The education level variable is organized in six levels,
depending on the education status of the household head, starting with no diploma (level 0).
This information is missing for some of the households in the sample. The variable indicating
whether the household head is inactive is equal to one if the household head is either a student,
retired, in long-term unemployment, or has no professional activity. We also use variables prox-
ying for the costs of holding inventories: the frequency of purchase, if the household has a car,
if the home has a dedicated room for storage (pantry), and if there is a dog. Those two last
variables are proxies for space availability and the size of the home.
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics on the purchased quantity per purchase occasion
and product category, as well as on household characteristics. Quantities are measured in
milliliters, except for co¤ee, which is measured in grams. The least frequently purchased product
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is whisky. All other products are very frequently purchased. Households visit on average 1.5
stores per week. However, some visit up to 10 stores per week. The frequency of purchase
variable measures how many times each household purchased each of the products during the
3-year period. The average value of this variable is 15, but it varies considerably across products
and households, and some households very rarely purchase some of these products.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Household characteristics
Age of household head (years) 45.41 14.96 18 94 11,572
Baby (1:yes, 0:no) 0.195 0.396 0 1 11,572
Inactive (1:yes, 0:no) 0.396 0.489 0 1 11,572
Car (1:yes, 0:no) 1.371 0.728 0 7 11,572
Pantry (1:yes, 0:no) 1.313 1.104 0 3 11,572
Dog (1:yes, 0:no) 0.438 0.756 0 8 11,572
Rural (1:yes, 0:no) 0.513 0.500 0 1 11,572
Rich (1:yes, 0:no) 0.308 0.462 0 1 11,572
Household size 2.976 1.436 1 9 11,572
Education level 2.469 1.353 0 5 8,976
Transaction characteristics
Nb. store visits per week 1.571 0.783 1 10 531,687
Frequency of purchases (number over 3 years) 15.00 21.33 1 154 35,434
Quantity per purchase
Beer (liters) 3.255 2.695 0.500 54 45,023
Co¤ee (kg) 0.473 0.301 0.250 6 122,362
Cola (liters) 3.367 3.067 0.330 72 86,127
Whisky (liters) 0.785 0.236 0.700 5 7,642
3 A Map of Price Dispersion in French Supermarkets
We examine price dispersion by focusing on the prices of two tightly dened products within
each category. Our product denition allows for only one source of di¤erentiation, i.e., the store
where they are purchased. Thus, for example, within the cola category, a product is dened by
its brand, whether it comes in a bottle or in a can, the pack size, whether it is diet cola, and the
size of the bottle or can. We select products with a high market share that are sold at a large
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number of stores. In each category, we choose the most frequently purchased product. The
second product chosen in a category is a product that, among those most frequently purchased,
has an average price that is clearly higher or lower than the rst product chosen.3
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics on the price distributions. The rst four columns
show the average price per liter in the case of liquids or per kilo in the case of co¤ee, the
coe¢ cient of variation, and the ratio of the third to the rst quartile, as well as the ratio of
the 95% to the 5% quantile. As there is no control for store heterogeneity (or period), even if
we are considering tightly dened products, they may nevertheless di¤er because they embed
potentially di¤erentiated characteristics of the store where they are purchased. Thus, part of the
price dispersion may be explained by product di¤erentiation and time variation. Although we
compare exactly identical goods, they are sold at di¤erent stores and in di¤erent time periods,
which means that the products are not homogenous from the consumers perspective.
To remove the heterogeneity across stores and periods from prices, we run product-by-
product regressions of prices, measured as log deviations from the weekly mean, on month,
year and supermarket chain xed e¤ects, store type, and regional dummies. The residuals of
these regressions represent prices of a homogeneous product or of the common attributes of the
good (Lach, 2002, Zhao, 2006, and Sorensen, 2000). However, these residual pricesimplicitly
assume that nal log-prices are linear combinations of the prices of individual attributes (the
sum of the price of the homogenous product and the price of the di¤erentiated services o¤ered
by the retailer) and can be biased due to mispecication.
The four last columns of Table 2 present some descriptive statistics for the dispersion of the
residuals of the xed e¤ects regressions described above. It includes weekly averages of the rst
and fourth quartiles and di¤erences between the rst and fourth quartiles and the 95% and 5%
quantiles (mean values of the residuals are zero by construction).
The statistics show that price dispersion is important in all categories considered. Indeed,
regarding the interquartile ratio, we see that 50% of prices in the middle of the distribution di¤er
by up to 34%. This di¤erence is less important for whisky (1%), which is the most expensive
product under study. Controlling for observed and unobserved xed product characteristics de-
3We consider the following products (we do not name brands but use A and B to signal that they are di¤erent
brands): (i) beer brand A, bottle size: 250 ml, pack: 24 bottles, and beer brand B, bottle size: 250 ml, pack:
10 bottles; (ii) co¤ee brand A, arabica, ca¤einated, 1 package per pack, package size 250g, and co¤ee brand
B, degustation, arabica, ca¤einated, 1 package per pack, package size 250g; (iii) cola brand A, plastic bottle,
non-diet, bottle size: 1500 ml, pack: 1 bottle, and cola brand B, plastic bottle, non-diet, bottle size: 1500 ml,
pack: 4 bottle; and (iv) whisky brand A, 1 liter bottle, not aged, blended, and whisky brand B, 1 liter bottle, 5
years aged, blended.
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creases price dispersion for all products but whisky A, for which price dispersion increases. Price
di¤erences remain, on average, high for many products. In terms of interquartile di¤erences,
the di¤erence in the prices in the middle of the price distribution can be as high as 29%.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Pricing Patterns
Uncontrolled Price Dispersion Residual
Avg Standard Coef of Log Price Dispersion
Category Product Price Deviation Variation Q75/Q25 Q95/Q5 Q75-Q25 Q95-Q5
Beer A 0.98 0.10 0.10 1.21 1.27 0.12 0.23
B 1.30 0.10 0.07 1.04 1.26 0.03 0.14
Cola A 0.705 0.05 0.07 1.08 1.18 0.21 0.48
B 0.494 0.11 0.23 1.28 1.81 0.21 0.48
Co¤ee A 8.73 0.64 0.07 1.10 1.22 0.06 0.16
B 4.49 0.77 0.17 1.34 1.70 0.29 0.45
Whisky A 15.5 1.65 0.11 1.01 1.44 0.06 0.21
B 14.9 0.63 0.04 1.02 1.05 0.02 0.06
Notes: Prices are in levels in the left panel, and in logs in the right panel
3.1 Temporal Price Dispersion
If stores positions in the price distribution remain constant, then consumers can learn the
identity of the cheapest store and there is no imperfect information about prices. That is,
before leaving home, consumers know where to nd the best deal and do not have to pay the
cost of visiting stores to determine which prices are being o¤ered. However, if stores periodically
change position in the price ranking, then consumers cannot learn before hand which deals
stores are o¤ering in a given period. The existence of temporal price dispersion is therefore
direct evidence of the importance of informational frictions, and it does not depend on any
restriction on consumer search behavior.4
To study the temporal price dispersion, we examine the position of stores in the cross-
sectional price distribution and measure how frequently they change position over time. Note
that if store services are an important part of the price of the otherwise homogenous product, we
could observe low transition probabilities even if the price of the homogeneous product is con-
stantly changing positions in the price ranking. The transition probabilities for the uncontrolled
4Standard tests of the importance of search costs consist in regressing measures of price dispersion on proxies
for search costs (or search benets) and on the number of rms in the market. However, Chandra and Tappata
(2009) show that the relationship between price dispersion and search costs or the number of rms on the supply
side is not necessarily monotone (and not always positive), depending crucially on restrictive assumptions on the
consumerssearch strategy.
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price should therefore be interpreted as a lower bound for the movements of the homogeneous
product in the cross-sectional ranking.
Table 3: Stores Transition Probabilities in the Price Ranking
Product Beer A Beer B
Rank t n Rank at t+ 1 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 0.472 0.204 0.163 0.120 0.484 0.230 0.138 0.103
2 0.288 0.293 0.234 0.142 0.332 0.361 0.214 0.077
3 0.195 0.214 0.320 0.235 0.15 0.199 0.423 0.198
4 0.189 0.118 0.281 0.341 0.129 0.097 0.200 0.523
Obs 2,642 4,489
Co¤ee A Co¤ee B
Rank t n Rank at t+ 1 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 0.583 0.071 0.161 0.146 0.408 0.198 0.200 0.157
2 0.415 0.171 0.220 0.111 0.335 0.264 0.255 0.134
3 0.403 0.098 0.273 0.201 0.235 0.265 0.287 0.191
4 0.351 0.059 0.208 0.337 0.192 0.240 0.304 0.192
Obs 4,558 1,392
Cola A Cola B
Rank t n Rank at t+ 1 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 0.641 0.143 0.119 0.080 0.497 0.197 0.161 0.067
2 0.264 0.467 0.132 0.113 0.353 0.242 0.170 0.104
3 0.235 0.193 0.375 0.184 0.303 0.250 0.230 0.143
4 0.121 0.106 0.164 0.587 0.278 0.185 0.166 0.232
Obs 12,740 1,237
Whisky A Whisky B
Rank t n Rank at t+ 1 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 0.438 0.200 0.182 0.117 0.522 0.159 0.147 0.083
2 0.286 0.289 0.231 0.131 0.408 0.185 0.223 0.076
3 0.233 0.185 0.313 0.202 0.202 0.174 0.261 0.206
4 0.181 0.177 0.247 0.301 0.142 0.162 0.311 0.284
Obs 1,586 862
Table 3 shows the average (across periods and stores) of the Markovian transition probabili-
ties for each product. For each week, we assign stores to one of the four price intervals limited by
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the quartiles of the price distribution.5 The transition probabilities in the table are the empir-
ical probabilities of changing from position j to position k, with j = 1; 2; 3; 4 and k = 1; 2; 3; 4.
When the price for a certain store in a certain period is not observed, the transition probability
(for that store and that period) is considered missing.
For all products, the probability of remaining in the rst position is higher than the other
transition probabilities, averaging between 1/3 and 1/2. The probability of remaining in the
same position from one week to the next varies between approximately 25 and 40%. This means
there is frequent movement in the price rankings, even over a short period of time. The evidence
implies that it is di¢ cult for consumers to keep track of which stores are o¤ering the best deals
each week.
3.2 Prices, Store Visits, and the Opportunity Cost of Time
If consumers have to incur a cost to determine prices, households with a higher opportunity
cost of time will shop around less and will, on average, pay higher prices for otherwise identical
products. A positive correlation between the cost of time and prices paid is therefore evidence
that imperfect information about prices a¤ects the demand behavior of consumers.
Notice that this test does not rely on any particular assumptions on consumers search
protocol or storespricing strategies. If information on the best deal is not readily and freely
available, then consumers with a high opportunity cost of time have a lower probability of
nding the best deals (because they search less) and pay on average higher prices. The same
reasoning applies for the probability of paying the lowest price available in the market that
period.
However, the test does rely on store and time xed e¤ects correctly controlling for potential
quality di¤erences between products purchased at di¤erent locations and in di¤erent periods.
If there are remaining di¤erences between the products, then a correlation between price and
the opportunity cost of time could indicate that households with a high opportunity cost of
time prefer purchasing at stores that o¤er more expensive services but not that search costs are
relevant.
As in Aguiar and Hurst (2007), to have comparable prices across products and product
categories, we use a product price index in which product prices are a quantity-weighted average
5That is, if a store is in position 1 at t, this means that its price at t is lower than or equal to the rst quartile
of the price distribution in that period. The store is in position 2 if its price is between the rst and second
quartiles and in position 3 if its price is between the second and third quartiles. Finally, the store is in position
4 if its price is greater than the third quartile.
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across households using quantities purchased in that period. Then, the category price index is
the total expenditure on that category divided by the cost of the same purchased quantities
of goods valued at each product price index dened above. This category price index captures
how much more or less than the average that the household is paying for a given category. We
also regress the probability of paying the lowest price for a product on the opportunity cost of
time. In this case, the dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if the price paid by
household i in period t for product j is equal to the lowest price (with a 2% margin) observed
in the market during that period.
The household characteristics used to capture the opportunity cost of time are the age and
its square, education level and professional activity status of the household head, the presence
of a baby of less than 4 years old, income level, and household size. We also include controls
for region of residence, frequency of purchases, the name of the store where the purchase was
made, the size of the store, and the period of purchase. Including the frequency of purchases
in the regression controls for the costs of holding inventories. Consumers with a higher cost
of holding inventories have to purchase more frequently and are thus less able to avoid high
prices. Therefore, we would expect the frequency of purchase to be positively correlated with
prices even if there were no search costs. Other controls for the cost of holding inventories are a
variable indicating whether the household has a car, whether the household has a dog (having
a dog is thought to be positively correlated with size of the home, see Hendel and Nevo, 2006),
and whether the household has a pantry.
Finally, we include a variable that measures the number of household store visits each week.
This measure comes from the complete dataset, which includes householdspurchases of any
food category. Hence, it includes all store visits that generated a positive purchase. The number
of store visits can be seen as an approximation of the search behavior of households or a proxy for
the amount of time the household dedicates to supermarket purchases. Further, note that the
larger the number of stores the consumer visits, the more information he gathers on transaction
prices and sales in a given period.
Table 4 reports the empirical results. The rst four columns show the estimates of the OLS
regression, where the dependent variable is the price index of the product (by household and
period). The next four columns show the probit model estimates where the dependent variable
is a binary variable equal to 1 if the household pays the lowest transaction price in the regional
market in that period.
The number of store visits is negatively correlated with prices and positively correlated with
the probability of paying the lowest price. Store visit coe¢ cients decrease in absolute value
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when we include proxies for householdsopportunity cost of time. This is expected because
these variables largely explain the number of store visits (see Table 5). There is strong empirical
evidence supporting the hypothesis that households with a higher opportunity cost of time pay
higher prices, even after controlling for store heterogeneity. The relationship between age and
prices is U-shaped, whereas the relationship between age and the probability of paying the
lowest price has an inverted U-shape. Having a baby increases transaction prices and decreases
the probability of paying the lowest price. Being inactive, however, reduces prices paid and
increases the probability of paying the lowest price.
-
Table 4: Opportunity Cost of Time and Prices
Transaction price Paying lowest price
(OLS) (Probit)
Store visits -0.103*** (0.014) -0.099*** (0.014) 0.032*** (0.002) 0.031*** (0.002)
Age -0.023*** (0.006) 0.010*** (0.001)
Age square 0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000)
Baby 0.104*** (0.035) -0.018*** (0.007)
Inactive -0.049* (0.025) 0.033*** (0.005)
Frequency 0.001*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000)
Car -0.382*** (0.064) -0.375*** (0.064) 0.054*** (0.013) 0.052*** (0.013)
Pantry -0.002 (0.023) 0.008 (0.023) 0.037*** (0.004) 0.034*** (0.004)
Dog -0.050** (0.022) -0.042* (0.022) 0.014 (0.004) 0.012*** (0.004)
Rural -0.030 (0.022) -0.035 (0.022) -0.020 (0.004) -0.018*** (0.004)
Rich -0.042* (0.023) -0.027 (0.023) 0.007 (0.004) 0.006 (0.005)
Household Size Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Level Yes Yes Yes Yes
Store Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 445,038 415,438
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
The columns in Table 5 show the coe¢ cient estimates of the regression of the number of
stores visited on the opportunity cost of time and other controls (rst estimated using OLS and
then with a Poisson model) and of a probit model for the probability of visiting more than 1 store
per week. Age and store visits have an inverted U-shaped relationship, implying that younger
and older consumers visit more stores in a week. Having a baby does not signicantly a¤ect
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store visits, but being inactive is positively correlated with store visits and the probability of
visiting more than one store. Living in a rural area and being wealthy are negatively correlated
with the number of store visits and the probability of visiting more than one store.
Table 5: Determinants of the number of stores visited
Store Visits Store Visits Store Visits>1
(OLS) (Poisson) (Probit)
Age 0.018*** (0.000) 0.011*** (0.000) 0.024*** (0.001)
Age square -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000)
Baby -0.008* (0.004) -0.004 (0.003) 0.010 (0.007)
Inactive 0.069*** (0.003) 0.043*** (0.002) 0.120*** (0.005)
Car -0.004 (0.008) -0.002 (0.005) 0.007 (0.132)
Pantry -0.005 (0.003) -0.003 (0.002) -0.021*** (0.005)
Dog -0.007** (0.003) -0.004** (0.002) -0.012 (0.004)
Rural -0.082*** (0.002) -0.052*** (0.002) -0.107*** (0.004)
Rich -0.022*** (0.003) -0.014*** (0.002) -0.019*** (0.005)
Hh size = 2 0.030*** (0.013) 0.021** (0.009) 0.116*** (0.020)
Hh size = 3 0.072*** (0.013) 0.048*** (0.009) 0.165*** (0.021)
Hh size = 4 0.117*** (0.012) 0.077*** (0.009) 0.255*** (0.021)
Hh size = 5 0.204*** (0.013) 0.130*** (0.009) 0.343*** (0.021)
Hh size = 6 0 201*** (0.015) 0.129*** (0.010) 0.328*** (0.023)
Hh size = 7 0.394*** (0.021) 0.235*** (0.012) 0.636*** (0.032)
Hh size = 8 0.239*** (0.034) 0.149*** (0.020) 0.344*** (0.049)
Hh size = 9 1.069*** (0.078) 0.545*** (0.031) 0.903*** (0.077)
Education level 1 -0.049*** (0.006) -0.030*** (0.004) -0.076*** (0.010)
Education level 2 -0.057*** (0.006) -0.035*** (0.003) -0.086*** (0.009)
Education level 3 -0.066*** (0.006) -0.041*** (0.004) -0.086*** (0.010)
Education level 4 -0.119*** (0.007) -0.076*** (0.004) -0.174*** (0.012)
Education level 5 -0.077*** (0.007) -0.048*** (0.004) -0.086*** (0.011)
Time Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Product Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
N 338,961 338,961 338,961
Notes: t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
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4 Consumer Behavior with Search Costs
We have shown evidence consistent with imperfect information about prices, which means that
consumers have to incur a cost to determine which prices are being o¤ered on the market in
a certain period of time. We now consider a choice model with costly search and develop an
empirical strategy to estimate the search cost distribution and the choice model parameters
when consumers are imperfectly informed.
Our demand model with search costs builds on Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004). However, in
their model, consumers are identical except for search costs, whereas we allow for observable
heterogeneity in preferences. This means that in our model products are both vertically and hor-
izontally di¤erentiated (i.e., consumers do not all agree on the value of each product attribute).
The horizontal dimension will be related to some observable consumer characteristics.
Another key di¤erence between our approach and theirs relates to the identication strat-
egy. They identify model parameters in two cases: when products are considered homogeneous
but the probability of visiting a given store is store specic and when products are vertically
di¤erentiated but drawing probabilities are homogeneous across stores. Under our identica-
tion strategy, we are able to identify model parameters when products are both vertically and
horizontally di¤erentiated and drawing probabilities are store, consumer, and period specic.
4.1 Model of Consumer Behavior
Consumers purchase at most one unit of the product. Before purchasing, consumers sequen-
tially search for the product with the highest indirect utility. Search is costly, and its cost
is heterogeneously distributed in the population of consumers. The cost of the rst quote is
normalized to zero. This ensures that everyone willing to purchase a product will do so. The
indirect utility of a consumer of type i from purchasing product j in period t is denoted uijt.
Note that within each consumer type i, search costs may vary, though valuations may not. We
assume consumers search with replacement.
Let Fit() be the belief distribution of indirect utilities uijt of a type-i consumer. Then,
the optimal search rule for a consumer of type i with search cost ci who has already found
the highest (among past searches) indirect utility uit is to search once more if the sunk cost of
searching is lower than the expected utility gain conditional on nding a better alternative:
ci 6
Z uit
uit
(u  uit) dFit (u) (1)
where uit is the upper bound of the support of Fit (). The above condition means that the
marginal cost of searching once more is smaller than or equal to the expected gain from searching
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once more given uit.
We assume that consumers know Fit(), which means that they know the support of the
distribution of indirect utilities, and hence they can label the Ni available products in ascending
order with respect to indirect utility: ui1t < ui2t < ::: < uiNit. For simplicity, we assume that
there are no two products (stores) that provide the same indirect utility. Notice that we index
the number of available products Ni by the consumer type i. This is to clarify that consumers
do not necessarily have access to the same products because they shop at di¤erent markets.
Note also that we index the ranking of indirect utilities (j = 1; ::; Ni) by t, the period of the
purchase, because the ranking may change from one period to the next.
As all indirect utilities of stores are strictly di¤erent, we obtain:
Fi (u)  P (uijt  u) =
XNi
k=1
ik1fuiktug (2)
where ik is the probability that the store ranked k is sampled by consumer i (this probability
belief is known by consumers and common to all consumers of type i) and 1fuiktug = 1 if and
only if uikt  u.
Using (1) and (2), yields the following cuto¤ points for the search cost distribution:
ctij 
XNi
k=j+1
ik (uikt   uijt) (3)
where ctij is the search cost level that makes any consumer of type i indi¤erent between pur-
chasing at store j and searching once more (i.e., it is the lowest possible search cost of any
type-i consumer who purchases product j). Because j is already quoted, products with indirect
utility lower than uijt do not enter the calculation of the expected gain from searching once
more (right-hand side of the above equation).
Note that although search costs are assumed to be time invariant, cuto¤ points depend on
the period of purchase. Note also that ctiNi = 0 and that the expected gain from an additional
search decreases with the index of the product, and hence, cti1 > :: > c
t
iN 1 > c
t
iN = 0.
Then, a consumer will purchase the worst product if he searches only once and nds the
lowest utility product in his rst and only draw. The probability of sampling store j = 1 on the
rst draw is equal to i1. Therefore, the demand for the lowest indirect utility store in period
t from type-i consumers is equal to
qti1 = i1

1 G  cti1 (4)
where G is the cumulative distribution function of search costs. Note that no type-i consumer
whose search cost is below cti1 purchases product 1 because he is always better o¤ (in expected
utility) by searching once more.
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Following the same type of reasoning, as in Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004), we obtain the
demand for the second lowest indirect utility store (numbered 2) as
qti2 = i2
"
1 +
i1G
 
cti1

1  i1
  G
 
cti2

1  i1
#
(5)
and for stores ranked j = 3; ::; Ni in the indirect utility ranks:
qtij = ij
"Xj
k=1
G
 
ctik 1
 G  ctik
1 Pk 1l=0 il
#
(6)
which can be re-written as
qtij = ij
241 +Xj 1
k=1
ikG
 
ctik

1 Pkl=0 il1 Pk 1l=0 il  
G

ctij

1 Pj 1l=0 il
35 (7)
where by convention G
 
cti0

= 1 and i0 = 0
4.2 Discussion of Assumptions
When shopping at supermarkets, consumers frequently purchase not an individual item but a
basket of goods. Purchasing a basket of goods is an equilibrium response for the existence of
search costs, which in our setting also include transportation costs. If search costs were zero,
consumers would buy each good at the store o¤ering it at the lowest price.
However, is true that even if perfectly informed about prices, consumers could decide to
buy all products in only one store to minimize travel. Arguably, modeling the search for a food
basket is a more realistic description of consumersgrocery-shopping behavior than the search
for a single product. However, considering the search for a basket of goods can be complex,
especially with respect to one-stop versus multiple-stop shopping. If a consumer is searching
for a basket of goods, he may buy a part of the basket in the rst visit, another part in the
second visit and so on until he purchases all items on his shopping list. The theoretical problem
allowing for multiple search and multiple-stop shopping is frequently intractable, and empirical
identication when search behavior is unobservable may be di¢ cult to obtain.6 We are not
aware of any paper in the literature that identies the parameters of the search model in the
context of multiple-stop shopping. Wildenbeest (2011) considers the search for a basket of food
products. However, he does not allow consumers to purchase di¤erent items from the basket
in di¤erent stores. In this case, consumers are concerned only with the total price or the total
utility of the bundle, and the multiproduct problem degenerates into a single product model.
Using data only on those purchases made under the same roof introduces selection bias and
6See, for example, Carlson and McAfee (1984) and Zhou (2014).
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probably an overestimation of search costs because the estimation process excludes the segment
of consumers with low transportation costs (or a low value of time) who are willing to shop
around.
Notice that search costs in our setting are the costs of determining transaction prices in a
certain period. This includes the transportation cost of reaching the store and assessing prices
(or browsing the internet or calling a friend), nding the product aisle and the product within the
aisle, registering the information, performing mental calculations, etc. We do not separately
identify these potentially di¤erent components of search costs. What is important here is
measuring the total marginal cost of search, or the total marginal cost of price information.
Following the empirical literature on search costs, we assume that there is perfect recall,
that is, consumers can return to previously searched stores at no additional cost. This is an
important assumption when the number of stores is nite because it guarantees that the optimal
search-stopping rule is stationary. Without perfect recall, the marginal cost of search depends
on the search history and the number of non-sampled stores (Jansen and Parakhonyak, 2014),
making identication extremely di¢ cult. When the number of stores is innite, stationarity
does not require perfect recall. In our application, there is a limited number of stores from
which consumers can search. However, we could assume that consumers perceive the number of
potential price draws as large because, in principle, they could continue searching the same stores
over time. Furthermore, an important part of the search cost may be nding the location of
the product in the aisle, mentally registering the price and performing the relevant calculations.
Hence, if one has to return to a previously searched product, one need not incur these costs
again.7
In our model, consumers search sequentially for the best deal. This means that, at every
price draw, they decide whether to continue searching by comparing the cost of an additional
search with the expected benet of an additional search. An alternative to sequential search is
to assume non-sequential or xed-sample search. In this case, before leaving home, consumers
decide on how many stores to visit before making a purchase decision. Hence, the number of
price draws is independent of the realizations of each draw.
De Los Santos, Hortaçsu and Wildenbeest (2012) test between a sequential and a non-
sequential search model using data on web browsing and purchase behavior. They nd evidence
that non-sequential search, or xed-sample search, provides a better description of how con-
sumers search for books online. We believe this is a less credible search protocol for the case of
brick-and-mortar supermarkets. It would imply, for instance, that even when consumers nd a
7The consumer does not need to remember all prices or indirect utilities, just the best deal.
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very good deal for an item in an early draw, they maintain the initial plan of visiting a xed
number of stores. It seems more realistic to assume that consumers leave home to purchase an
item, and when they nd it at a price lower than a certain reservation price, they buy the item
during that visit and stop searching, which is the behavior implied by the sequential search
assumption.
4.3 Identication
First, let us assume that we (as econometricians) know the consumer type i drawing probability
ij of a store ranked j. If we observe indirect utility rankings, then it is straightforward to
obtain G(ctij), for j = 1; ::; Ni, by solving the system of equations (4) to (6) above, using
observed purchases in store j by consumer type i and the probabilities ij .
The problem is that the support of the indirect utilities is unknown to the econometrician.
In the case in which there is only price di¤erentiation, these consumer-specic rankings are
simply the observed price ranks. Otherwise, we cannot use prices to rank each alternatives
indirect utilities, which depend on consumer preferences for horizontally di¤erentiated goods.
Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004) rst identify parameters by assuming that products are ho-
mogeneous. In this case, prices rank indirect utilities. Then, they assume vertical di¤erentiation
but restrict drawing probabilities to be equal across products and periods. However, thanks to
the observation of purchase quantity and the identication of drawing probabilities from all
store visits, we can identify the model parameters even when products are di¤erentiated and
drawing probabilities vary across stores, consumers, and period.
Note that (7) implies:
qtij
ij
  q
t
ij 1
ij 1
=
G(ctij 1) G(ctij)
1 Pj 1l=0 il > 0
which means that
0 <
qti1
i1
<
qti2
i2
< ::: <
qtiNi
iNi
Hence, if for any store s, we know quantities qtis and the probabilities of drawing that store is,
we know the elements of the vector of ratios
n
qtir
ir
o
r=1;::;Ni
and can then recover the ranking of
indirect utilities of the di¤erent stores for each type i. Thus the rank j(s) of store s will be:
j(s) =
XNi
r=1
1 qt
ir
ir
<
qt
is

is
 (8)
and for simplicity of notation, we will write qtij for q
t
ij(s) and ij for ij(s) for any store s.
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Knowing
qtij
ij
and ij , equations (4) to (7) provide the following triangular system in the
unknowns G(ctij) given all choice probabilities ij 2 (0; 1):8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
qti1
i1
= 1 G  cti1
qti2
i2
= 1 + i11 i1G
 
cti1
  11 i1G  cti2
qti3
i3
= 1 + i11 i1G
 
cti1

+ i2(1 i1)(1 i1 i2)G
 
cti2
  1(1 i1 i2)G  cti3
::
qtij
ij
= 1 +
Pj 1
k=1
ikG(ctik)
(1 Pkl=0 il)(1 Pk 1l=0 il)  
G(ctij)
1 Pj 1l=0 il
that we can solve to nd:8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
G
 
cti1

= 1  qti1i1
G
 
cti2

= 1  qti1   (1  i1) q
t
i2
i2
:::
G

ctij

= 1 Pjk=1  qtikik   qtik 1ik 11 Pk 1l=0 il
(9)
The above system enables identication of the value of the search cost cumulative distribution
function evaluated at the cuto¤ points, that is G(ctij) for j = 1; ::; Ni.
If we know the cumulative distribution function G and if it has non-zero density on its
support such that G is invertible, we can invert G and identify ctij by:
ctij = G
 1  G(ctij)
and identify the indirect utilities up to a constant by solving the system of equations given by
(3). Let us then assume that G(:) belongs to a known family of c.d.f. parameterized by  and
denoted G(:; ). The lowest utility in each period is normalized to zero. Hence, there are Ni 1
equations and Ni   1 unknown values utik for each type i consumer:
uikt =
cti1PN
j=2 ij
+
Xk 1
k0=2
tik0cik0PN
j=k0+1 ij
PN
j=k0 ij
   ctikPN
j=k ij
(10)
for k = 2; ::; Ni and uti1 = 0.
Indirect utilities utij depend on joint characteristics of the consumer and store denoted xijt,
common parameters t, price pjt and a consumer-store-specic random deviation to mean utility
vijt such that:
uijt = xijt + t   ipjt + vijt (11)
In practice, xijt are observable characteristics of the store (that may vary with the consumer
type), t are time-period xed e¤ects, pjt is the price paid for product j in period t, and i
and  are parameters. Consumersvaluation of product characteristics has both horizontal and
vertical dimensions.
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The probability is that a consumer of type i nds store s can be identied empirically from
the observation of all store visits made by the di¤erent households. Using data on all searches
that generated a positive purchase of at least one product category (not only the categories we
focus on) allows for such identication.8 Once is is identied, as the rank j(s) of store s in the
indirect utility space is identied using (8), we obtain the drawing probability of rank j store
for consumer type i as ij =
PNi
s=1 1fj(s)=jgis.
Then, (9) yields:
ctij () = G
 1
 
1 
Xj
k=1
 
qtik
ik
  q
t
ik 1
ik 1
!
1 
Xk 1
l=0
il

; 
!
Using (10), we have
ui2t () =
cti1 ()  cti2 ()PN
j=2 ij
and for k  3,
uikt () =
cti1 ()PN
j=2 ij
+
Xk 1
k0=2
ik0c
t
ik0 ()PN
j=k0+1 ij
PN
j=k0 ij
   ctik ()PN
j=k ij
Note that by construction uikt () > uik 1t () because
uikt ()  uik 1t () =
ctik 1 ()  ctik ()PN
j=k ij
> 0
As prices may be endogenously chosen after stores observe vijt, this may generate a correlation
between vijt and the prices pjt. We thus cannot use an orthogonality condition between prices
and unobserved shocks vijt; instead, we assume that we observe some instrumental variables
zijt that are uncorrelated with vijt, such that (11) gives the following moment condition:
E [(uijt ()  xijt   t + ipjt) zijt] = 0 (12)
Using this moment condition allows us to identify the parameters , , t, i provided the usual
rank condition for GMM.
5 Estimation and Empirical Results
5.1 Search Cost and Preferences Estimates
We dene consumer types using the region of residence, whether they live in an urban or
rural area, and whether their income is above or below the median income ("rich" or "poor",
8Another route would be to parameterize the probability of sampling a certain store and estimate its para-
meters as in Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004).
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respectively). Hence, there are four types of consumers per region: poor and urban, poor and
rural, rich and urban, and rich and rural.
We assume that search costs are log-normally distributed over the population of consumers,
thus taking G (:; ) as log-normal. The search cost model is estimated for beer, cola, co¤ee, and
whisky. Di¤erent products within the category di¤er with respect to the store where they are
bought but also with respect to other observable characteristics of the products. The observed
product characteristics that enter the utility function are product brand and container material.
Store and region xed e¤ects capture observable and unobservable characteristics of the store.
We also include time period xed e¤ects (year and month) that capture common shocks. Price
coe¢ cients are allowed to vary with consumer type (i).
As instruments, we use the weekly average price paid by other household types living in the
same region, as well as lagged prices. These instruments are assumed to be uncorrelated with
consumer-specic taste shocks vijtbut are likely correlated with store j0s price pjt, such that the
rank condition of the GMM estimation method is satised.
Drawing probabilities are identied and estimated from the data of all purchases made by
the consumer. We observe all households store visits that generated a purchase. We thus
identify the probability a type-i household visits a store in a week t as the ratio of the number
of visits to store j during t by all households of type i, over their total number of store visits
during that week.
Table 7 displays the average (across regions and periods) of the cumulative distribution
function values G(ctij) evaluated at the search cost cuto¤s c
t
ij for each type of consumer and
store ranked j = 1; ::; 5, and each of the four products studied. We denote by Gj these averages
for j = 1; ::; 5.
On average, the proportion of people that do not search (1 G1) is between 50% and 60%,
depending on the product and consumer type. The proportion of people who search more than
once does not vary substantially across products. In general, people living in urban areas are
more likely than their rural counterparts to search at least once, but there is no consistent
di¤erence in the proportion of people searching across income levels. The proportion of people
searching decreases rapidly with the number of searches: approximately 20% of consumers
search once (G1   G2), only half of them search twice (G2   G3), and less than 1% search 3
times.
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Table 7: C.d.f. value estimates at search cuto¤s points
Product Consumer Type G1 G2 G3 G4 G5
Beer
urban poor 0.501 0.308 0.177 0.083 0.025
rich 0.467 0.273 0.146 0.062 0.021
rural poor 0.442 0.263 0.146 0.065 0.021
rich 0.466 0.280 0.144 0.059 0.015
Co¤ee
urban poor 0.446 0.262 0.149 0.070 0.023
rich 0.462 0.278 0.157 0.071 0.022
rural poor 0.415 0.241 0.132 0.063 0.020
rich 0.450 0.273 0.155 0.076 0.025
Cola
urban poor 0.485 0.297 0.168 0.082 0.027
rich 0.457 0.272 0.143 0.060 0.016
rural poor 0.454 0.284 0.164 0.080 0.025
rich 0.475 0.295 0.165 0.074 0.023
Whisky
urban poor 0.447 0.252 0.132 0.052 0.015
rich 0.405 0.189 0.102 0.060 0.060
rural poor 0.471 0.250 0.108 0.046 0.013
rich 0.421 0.206 0.096 0.042 0.009
Notes: Each cell d isp lays the m ean across reg ions and p eriods of the p er product
p er consum er typ e share of consumers that are w illing to search at least j tim es for G j.
Table 8 shows the results of the estimation of the utility parameters. All price coe¢ cients
are negative and signicant, except for rural and poor whisky consumers, for whom it is not
signicantly di¤erent from zero. In general, urban households have higher (in absolute terms)
price coe¢ cients than rural households. Colas indirect utilities are more price sensitive than
those of any other product. Indirect utilities not only have di¤erent price slopes depending on
the type but also di¤erent intercepts (signicant coe¢ cients for rich and rural), making clear
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the importance of allowing for heterogeneous tastes.
Table 8: GMM estimation of utility parameters
Product
Beer Co¤ee Cola Whisky
Price Coe¢ cients (i)
(urban, poor) -0.004*** -0.028*** -0.261*** -0.011***
0.001 0.002 0.017 0.001
(urban, rich) -0.111*** -0.030*** -0.143*** -0.003***
0.008 0.002 0.013 0.001
(rural, poor) -0.054*** -0.022*** -0.203*** 0.000
0.006 0.002 0.017 0.000
(rural, rich) -0.066*** -0.036*** -0.169*** -0.002***
0.006 0.003 0.015 0.001
Rich 0.274*** 0.282*** 0.008*** -0.030***
0.013 0.014 0.002 0.009
Rural -0.022*** -0.004*** 0.062*** -0.116***
0.003 0.001 0.007 0.012
Store xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other product characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region and period xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 18,392 21,657 20,181 14,184
Notes: t statistics in parentheses; IV estimation;* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01;
other product characteristics are brand and container material.
5.2 Price Elasticities
Having estimated the search cost distribution and consumer preferences, we can estimate the
own- and cross-price elasticities of demand in this consumer search model. In our consumer
search model, consumers rank store-specic indirect utilities that depend on price. Thus, prices
a¤ect the demanded quantity at the chosen store among those searched. However, price also
a¤ect search behavior by changing the share of consumers willing to search once, twice, three
times, etc., which changes the composition of consumers purchasing at each store and who
may end up preferring a given store. We derive the full expressions for own- and cross-price
elasticities in the Appendix, but the partial derivatives with respect to price at store l of the
23
store s demand are:
@qtis (p)
@plt
=
XNi
j=1
"
@P (j(s) = j)
@plt
qtij (p) + P (j(s) = j)
@qtij (p)
@plt
#
(13)
where P (j(s) = j) is the probability that store s is ranked j among indirect utilities. Moreover,
the derivations in the Appendix show that when one store changes its own price, it a¤ects the
rank of that store in the indirect utility space of each consumer type, as well as the indi¤erence
cuto¤ points in the search cost distribution.
This shows that information frictions on the side of the consumer (the search cost distri-
bution), as well as the drawing probabilities of each store available to the consumer, plays an
important role in the price elasticity of demand at each store in addition to the usual e¤ect of
consumersmarginal utility of income i.
For the sake of comparison, we use the specication of (11) and estimate consumer prefer-
ences under the assumption that there are no informational frictions. In this case, we simply
need to estimate a logit model (Berry, 1994) using the same instrumental variables as in the
search model to obtain consumerspreference estimates and thus own- and cross-price elastici-
ties.
In Tables 9 through 12, we report estimated price elasticities yielded by our search model,
as well as the price elasticities obtained in the model with no information frictions. The tables
provide the average price elasticities across consumer types and periods per store and product
category.
All diagonal elements (own-price elasticities) are negative, as expected, with the exception
of whisky own-price elasticities in the perfect information logit model. The logit model assumes
that consumers observe all prices before making a purchase. Hence, when consumers do not buy
the product at the best price, they appear to be price-insensitive, whereas in reality, they had
been uninformed about it. Co¤ee, and then cola, are the product categories with highest own-
and cross-price elasticities, whereas whisky is the product category with less elastic demand.
Notice that the full information logit model yields biased price elasticities. The direction of the
bias, however, depends on the product. In the case of beer and co¤ee, the logit price elasticities
underestimate the price elasticities in the search model. Conversely, cola price elasticities are
consistently higher under the search model than under the logit model. These results are in line
with Koulayev (2014), who also nds that the bias of the price elasticities of the full information
model can go either way.
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Table 9: Price Elasticities in Search and Full Information Models (Beer)
Model store 1 store 2 store 3 store 4 store 5 store 6
store 1 search -0.044 0.021 0.014 0.032 0.017 0.014
(0.112) (0.042) (0.115) (0.805) (0.443) (0.390)
logit -0.008 0.012 0.018 0.017 0.024 0.012
(0.082) (0.064) (0.061) (0.059) (0.068) (0.039)
store 2 search 0.026 -0.314 0.067 0.071 0.092 0.089
(0.039) (0.501) (0.118) (0.148) (0.459) (0.140)
logit 0.001 -0.103 0.019 0.018 0.029 0.015
(0.017) (0.282) (0.057) (0.058) (0.073) (0.044)
store 3 search 0.026 0.069 -0.339 0.083 0.088 0.100
(0.039) (0.113) (0.599) (0.246) (0.209) (0.183)
logit 0.002 0.014 -0.104 0.019 0.030 0.015
(0.020) (0.049) (0.234) (0.059) (0.074) (0.043)
store 4 search 0.050 0.140 0.133 -0.749 0.154 0.165
(0.068) (0.239) (0.219) (1.195) (0.211) (0.213)
logit 0.001 0.014 0.021 -0.130 0.029 0.021
(0.023) (0.049) (0.054) (0.262) (0.066) (0.050)
store 5 search 0.018 0.046 0.044 4.539 -0.284 0.070
(0.031) (0.106) (0.100) (278.821) (0.618) (0.175)
logit 0.000 0.011 0.017 0.017 -0.096 0.013
(0.023) (0.063) (0.060) (0.060) (0.231) (0.041)
store 6 search 0.012 0.031 0.031 0.083 0.042 -0.248
(0.022) (0.063) (0.061) (3.156) (0.176) (2.183)
logit 0.001 0.013 0.019 0.018 0.026 -0.091
(0.021) (0.063) (0.059) (0.059) (0.070) (0.217)
Notes: M ean elastic ities across consumer typ es and p eriods w ith standard deviations in parentheses
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Table 10: Price Elasticities in Search and Full Information Models (Co¤ee)
Model store 1 store 2 store 3 store 4 store 5 store 6
store 1 search -0.102 0.049 0.073 -10.906 -8.323 -100.341
(0.189) (0.057) (1.150) (761.047) (546.391) (5009.560)
logit -0.120 0.085 0.115 0.098 0.123 0.059
(0.108) (0.082) (0.097) (0.112) (0.110) (0.089)
store 2 search 0.074 -1.103 0.264 0.254 0.277 0.325
(0.112) (1.567) (0.361) (0.403) (0.404) (0.408)
logit 0.017 -0.551 0.113 0.100 0.130 0.067
(0.023) (0.230) (0.095) (0.113) (0.109) (0.091)
store 3 search 0.066 0.212 -1.015 0.222 0.234 0.286
(0.084) (0.284) (1.297) (0.424) (1.436) (0.723)
logit 0.019 0.084 -0.526 0.099 0.128 0.064
(0.024) (0.080) (0.210) (0.113) (0.110) (0.091)
store 4 search 0.160 0.560 0.594 -2.853 0.600 0.686
(0.166) (0.617) (0.617) (3.101) (0.599) (0.616)
logit 0.017 0.077 0.107 -0.619 0.131 0.087
(0.021) (0.073) (0.090) (0.248) (0.107) (0.095)
store 5 search 0.053 0.180 0.192 0.191 -0.960 0.242
(0.064) (0.238) (0.242) (0.419) (1.817) (0.574)
logit 0.018 0.083 0.114 0.101 -0.537 0.063
(0.024) (0.079) (0.097) (0.112) (0.213) (0.090)
store 6 search 0.040 0.134 0.142 0.144 30.670 -0.970
(0.052) (0.167) (0.190) (0.633) (1978.501) (1.913)
logit 0.019 0.084 0.115 0.099 0.124 -0.493
(0.025) (0.081) (0.097) (0.113) (0.109) (0.200)
Notes: M ean elastic ities across consumer typ es and p eriods w ith standard deviations in parentheses
26
Table 11: Price Elasticities in Search and Full Information Models (Cola)
Model store 1 store 2 store 3 store 4 store 5 store 6
store 1 search -0.093 0.047 0.046 0.036 0.036 -0.025
(0.182) (0.057) (0.241) (2.685) (2.428) (4.538)
logit -0.415 0.237 0.291 0.231 0.299 0.118
(0.411) (0.213) (0.250) (0.281) (0.285) (0.204)
store 2 search 0.047 -0.667 0.153 -3.727 -2.123 -1.829
(0.056) (0.986) (0.220) (248.021) (132.817) (86.331)
logit 0.070 -1.404 0.278 0.225 0.317 0.138
(0.094) (0.414) (0.240) (0.275) (0.284) (0.214)
store 3 search 0.052 0.156 -0.780 0.173 -14.498 0.230
(0.065) (0.226) (1.095) (0.298) (858.276) (0.858)
logit 0.066 0.220 -1.432 0.237 0.330 0.141
(0.083) (0.193) (0.416) (0.280) (0.283) (0.215)
store 4 search 0.134 0.423 0.452 -2.208 0.427 0.484
(0.130) (0.491) (0.497) (2.535) (0.422) (0.402)
logit 0.063 0.208 0.273 -1.641 0.349 0.198
(0.090) (0.186) (0.227) (0.481) (0.267) (0.232)
store 5 search 0.036 0.108 0.113 0.123 -0.645 0.167
(0.046) (0.153) (0.163) (0.277) (0.933) (0.264)
logit 0.068 0.219 0.280 0.393 -1.431 0.131
(0.091) (0.196) (0.238) (0.266) (0.348) (0.211)
store 6 search 0.027 0.086 0.091 0.097 0.093 -0.827
(0.039) (0.132) (0.148) (0.230) (0.771) (0.962)
logit 0.071 0.229 0.285 0.241 0.308 -1.356
(0.094) (0.203) (0.246) (0.282) (0.285) (0.337)
Notes: M ean elastic ities across consumer typ es and p eriods w ith standard deviations in parentheses
27
Table 12: Price Elasticities in Search and Full Information Models (Whisky)
Model store 1 store 2 store 3 store 4 store 5 store 6
store 1 search -0.021 0.007 0.006 -4.323 -5.617 -0.094
(0.068) (0.021) (0.107) (172.205) (152.593) (2.069)
logit 0.147 -0.046 -0.044 -0.019 -0.013 -0.004
(0.198) (0.100) (0.090) (0.057) (0.046) (0.027)
store 2 search 0.010 -0.085 0.023 0.018 0.024 0.053
(0.016) (0.147) (0.049) (0.065) (0.146) (0.117)
logit -0.047 0.306 -0.052 -0.025 -0.020 -0.007
(0.089) (0.268) (0.089) (0.063) (0.056) 0.036)
store 3 search 0.011 0.016 -0.091 0.025 0.036 0.057
(0.021) (0.039) (0.231) (0.207) (0.238) (0.107)
logit -0.048 -0.049 0.269 -0.022 -0.019 -0.006
(0.099) (0.103) (0.251) (0.059) (0.053) (0.032)
store 4 search 0.026 0.038 0.051 -0.289 0.059 0.142
(0.055) (0.092) (0.119) (0.6719 (0.125) (0.199)
logit -0.036 -0.041 -0.048 0.296 -0.026 -0.012
(0.073) (0.081) (0.0859 (0.268) (0.060) (0.044)
store 5 search 0.008 0.014 0.019 0.020 -0.200 0.083
(0.027) (0.041) (0.052) (0.070) (0.404) (0.114)
logit -0.035 -0.042 -0.047 -0.022 0.276 -0.007
(0.071) (0.096) (0.094) (0.061) (0.276) (0.034)
store 6 search 0.007 0.012 0.016 0.016 0.031 -0.321
(0.017) (0.032) (0.047) (0.160) (0.156) (0.495)
logit -0.051 -0.040 -0.043 -0.019 -0.015 0.247
(0.103) (0.088) (0.087) (0.057) (0.048) (0.239)
Notes: M ean elastic ities across consumer typ es and p eriods w ith standard deviations in parentheses
6 Conclusion
Price dispersion is an important characteristic of the French food market. Price dispersion is
also persistent over time, with stores frequently changing positions in the price ranking, implying
that it is di¢ cult for consumers to be perfectly informed about prices in every period. We nd
empirical evidence consistent with a demand model with imperfectly informed consumers who
need to engage in costly search to nd the available deals. We show that consumers with a high
opportunity cost of time search less and pay higher prices on average. Moreover, the number of
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stores that a household visits in a certain week, which can be seen as a proxy for search activity,
is negatively correlated with prices.
We develop an empirical strategy to estimate the magnitude and distribution of sequential
search costs. Products are vertically di¤erentiated, and consumer tastes are heterogeneous. We
identify the search cost distribution without having to make any restriction on the drawing prob-
abilities of stores. The drawing probabilities are recovered from the data and are heterogeneous
across time, store chain, and household type.
The results of the structural estimation show that search costs for the products considered
(beer, co¤ee, cola, and whisky) are high and that the majority of consumers do not search much.
There is also indication that urban consumers tend to search more than rural consumers, which
is likely related to higher store density in urban areas, which decreases the cost of visiting
multiple stores. Price elasticity measures show that the perfect information model yields biased
elasticities. The magnitude of the bias is large, and its direction depends on the product. This
is in line with Koulayev (2014)s results. Further note that previous literature reports both
overestimation (Sovinsky, 2008) and underestimation (De los Santos, Hortaçsu and Wildenbeest,
2012, Honka, 2014) of the imperfect information measures.
7 Appendix
7.1 Own and Cross-price elasticities in the Search Model
For any of the store s 2 f1; ::; Ng and any consumer type i, the store s demand qti;s by type i is
qti;s (pt) =
XN
j=1
P (j(s) = j) qtij (pt)
where j(s) is the utility rank of store s among all stores available for consumer i and qtij is the
demand to store ranked j by consumer i at t that depends on the vectors of all prices pt.
Then, assuming that vijt is i.i.d. type I extreme value in (11), we have can write P (j(s) = j)
as a function of all characteristics and prices. Actually, denoting sj the set of subsets of size
j   1 of the set f1; :::; Ng n fsg, we have
P (j(s) = 1) = P (uist  uirt ; 8 r 2 f1; :::; Ng)
=
1
1 +
PN
r=1 exp ((xist   xirt)    (pst   prt))
and for j = 2; ::; N
P (j(s) = j) =
X

2sj
P
 
uirt < uist  uir0t ;8 r 2 
; 8r0 =2 


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because the probability that store s is of rank j is equal to the probability that j 1 stores have
lower utility and N   j + 1 have higher utility, and this happen for all possible combinations
in two groups of the other N   1 stores (the group of stores with lower utility being denoted 

and the group of stores not belonging to 
 that will have higher utility than s).
For a given store s, the set sj is thus
sj =
[



  f1; 2; ::; Ng| {z }
s:t: card(
)=j 1 and s=2

Then, for any set 
 2 sj , the probability that uist is the larger in 
 [ fsg and the smaller
in f1; :::; Ng n
 is
P
 
uirt < uist  uir0t; 8r 2 
; r0 =2 


= P (uirt < uist ;8 r 2 
)P
 
uist  uir0t ;8 r0 =2 


= maxs;
 (p)
min
s;
 (p)
where
maxs;
 (p)  P (uirt < uist ;8 r 2 
) =
1
1 +
P
r2
 exp ((xirt   xist)    (prt   pst))
and
mins;
 (p)  P
 
uist  uir0t ; 8 r0 =2 


=
Y
r0 =2

P (uist  uir0t)
=
Y
r0 =2

1
1 + exp ((xir0t   xist)    (pr0t   pst))
We can now write
@P (j(s) = j)
@plt
=
X

2sj
@
@plt
P
 
uirt < uist < uir0t ;8 r 2 
sj ;8r0 =2 
sj

=
X

2sj
maxs;
 (p)
@mins;
 (p)
@plt
+ mins;
 (p)
@maxs;
 (p)
@plt
where
@mins;
 (p)
@plt
and
@maxs;
 (p)
@plt
are as below.
If l = s :
@mins;
 (p)
@plt
= 
X
r0 =2

24 exp ((xir0t   xist)    (pr0t   pst))
[1 + exp ((xir0t   xist)    (pr0t   pst))]2
Y
r=2
nfr0g
1
1 + exp ((xirt   xist)    (prt   pst))
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= 
X
r0 =2

"
exp ((xir0t   xist)    (pr0t   pst))
[1 + exp ((xir0t   xist)    (pr0t   pst))]
Y
r=2

1
1 + exp ((xirt   xist)    (prt   pst))
#
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and thus
@mins;
 (p)
@plt
= mins;
 (p)
X
r0 =2

exp ((xir0t   xist)    (pr0t   pst))
[1 + exp ((xir0t   xist)    (pr0t   pst))] if l = s
If l 6= s and l =2 
 :
@mins;
 (p)
@plt
=
Y
r=2
;r 6=l
1
1 + exp ((xirt   xist)    (prt   pst))
 exp ((xilt   xist)    (plt   pst))
[1 + exp ((xilt   xist)    (plt   pst))]2
= mins;
 (p)
exp ((xilt   xist)    (plt   pst))
[1 + exp ((xilt   xist)    (plt   pst))]
If l 6= s and l 2 
 :
@mins;
 (p)
@plt
= 0
We also have
@maxs;
 (p)
@plt
=
@
@plt

1
1 +
P
r2
 exp ((xirt   xist)    (prt   pst))

=  1fs=l;l =2
g

P
r2
 exp ((xirt   xilt)    (prt   plt)) 
1 +
P
r2
 exp ((xirt   xilt)    (prt   plt))
2
+1fl2
;l 6=sg
 exp ((xilt   xist)    (plt   pst))
1 +
P
r2
 exp ((xirt   xist)    (prt   pst))
2
=  1fs=l;l =2
gmaxl;
 (p)
 
1  maxl;
 (p)

+1fl2
;l 6=sg exp ((xilt   xist)    (plt   pst))maxs;
 (p)2
This allows to obtain
@qti;s(pt)
@plt
using
@qtis (p)
@plt
=
XNi
j=1
"
@P (j(s) = j)
@plt
qtij (p) + P (j(s) = j)
@qtij (p)
@plt
#
(14)
where
@qtij (p)
@plt
= ij
Xj 1
k=1
ikg
 
ctik
 @ctik
@plt
1 Pkk0=0 ik01 Pk 1k0=0 ik0  ijg
 
ctij
 @ctij
@plt
Xj 1
k=1
1
1 Pj 1k0=0 ik0
that is
@qtij (p)
@plt
=  ij
Xj 1
k=1
ikg
 
ctik
PNi
k0=k+1 ik0
 
1fj(l)=k0g   1fj(l)=kg

1 Pkk0=0 ik01 Pk 1k0=0 ik0
+ijg
 
ctij
 Xj 1
k=1
1
1 Pj 1k0=0 ik0
!XNi
k0=j+1
ik0
 
1fj(l)=k0g   1fj(l)=jg

because using (3), we have
@ctik
@plt
=
XNi
k0=k+1
ik0
@
@plt
(uik0t   uikt) =  
XNi
k0=k+1
ik0
 
1fj(l)=k0g   1fj(l)=kg

and
qtij = ij
241 +Xj 1
k=1
ikG
 
ctik

1 Pkk0=0 ik01 Pk 1k0=0 ik0  
G

ctij

1 Pj 1k0=0 ik0
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where by convention G
 
cti0

= 1 and i0 = 0.
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